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„We will have to deal with the complexity we have discovered. 
But this very complexity will lead to new disciplines, 
which will help us to transfer our knowledge from one domain to another. 
Perhaps the challenge of these coming years will be to master complexity.” 
Ilya Prigogine
1. INTRODUCTION
For a long time, economic practitioners believed that we have reached the age 
of comfort in terms of economic governance. Robert Lucas, a Nobel Laureate 
in economics, triumphantly stressed that the tempestuous times are now belong-
ing to the past because macroeconomics has succeeded: Its central problem of 
depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact 
been solved for many decades (Lucas 2003:1). Then the traumatising impact of 
the 2008–2009 global financial and economic crisis forced economics profession 
to ‘stop for a word’. The embarrassing question of the Queen of England ‘why 
did nobody see the crisis of 2008 coming’ emblematically signalled the failure of 
the collective imagination of the entire profession to understand the system and 
its emerging patterns. It is hardly by chance that when other prominent scholars, 
the Nobel-Prize winners Thomas J. Sargent and Christopher Sims were asked at 
dinner after the Nobel Prize ceremony in 2011 about what their lifeworks convey 
about the recent crisis, the answer was nothing but silence. It has become clear 
that when fire station burns down, our models become insufficient in time of 
enormous instabilities. Consequently, in the light of such annoyingly unanswered 
questions, there is a growing incredulity at prevailing economics (Csaba 2009; 
Coyle 2012; Zingales 2013; Galbraith 2014; PCES 2014; Keen 2017).
Our paper proposes the audacious claim that some questions are not only em-
barrassing, but also unanswerable due to our limited understanding of their em-
beddedness into the complex system we live in. For example, should we remove 
Greece from the Eurozone or help the debt-ridden country to remain? Shall we 
increase EU budget or create further funds to build up a transfer system? Which is 
more important in proper crisis management, fiscal or monetary policy? Shall the 
state inject ever-more financial support into the economy to spark digital transfor-
mation even though the productivity growth has been secularly declining despite 
the unprecedented level of digitization of today? Which regions (more advanced 
or less developed) should be primarily targeted via state transfers and other sup-
port programmes by taking into account the side-effect of increasing inequalities 
as well as the limited fiscal room for maneouvre? Is it really rationale to support 
and pick up gazelles (fast-growing firms), though being a late comer can also be 
advantageous both for the firm and for the macroeconomy through exaptation?
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Some even called for a thorough revision of economics to restore its beacon 
role in understanding what is really going on in the economy. Our paper, without 
being exhaustive, is to demonstrate that crises and scandals do not mean that the 
science of economics is in the shade of intrinsic failure. Most of the problems 
occurred because we ignored what we once knew about the economic system by 
merely cherishing deeply ingrained and seductive assumptions. As a corollary, a 
complexity-aware economics is blatantly needed to better map the interactions in 
grasping what in heaven and hell is really going on.
2. FROM PARMENIDES TO HERACLITUS –
 COMPLEXITY AND COMPLEXITY SCIENCE?
From the dawn of civilisation, mankind has been seeking for and wanting to see cer-
tainty. There was a time of classical science when questions like ‘Which events will 
remain without substantial repercussions?’, ‘What kinds of interactions will shape 
the entire functioning of the big system?’ or ‘Which event can repel us towards irre-
versible changes?’ never occured across the board. At that time, analysing the laws 
of res extensa, that is to say, the natural (physical) world over the res cogitans (a 
world with human mind) was dominating with the logical consequences of assum-
ing determinism and timelessness (time-reversibility) together with stability and 
equilibrium. In fact, that ideology summoned the central worldview of the ancient 
Greek philosopher Parmenides who was resolutely arguing that change is impos-
sible and all kinds of existence in the universe is timeless. That Cartesian Zeitgeist 
gave the impression that certainty is everything, and since certainty equals with 
truth, the ultimate goal of science is to find truths (universal laws).1
There were three interlinked assumptions grounding classical science. First is 
determinism and equilibrium. Laplace’s famous demon is equipped with the lapis 
philosophorum to overlook ex ante and ex post the system and to predict the future. 
It gave a misleading feeling of comfort that time (and its consequence: irreversibil-
ity is negligible), thus concentrating only on structures rather than also involving 
the processes and relationships is an instructive way forward. Second is reduc-
tionism, which builds to a great extent on the Aristotelian and Ockhamian logic, 
1  Let us recall the mechanistic and atomic worldview of Pierre Gassendi or that of Galileo 
Galilei in the 17th century, who all thought that the universe is written in the language of 
mathematics, hence measurement is inevitably everything and the world can be fully de-
scribed and known by 3-4 or maximum 5 fundamental laws (e.g. Newton’s laws of mechan-
ics (1686), Maxwell’s laws in electrodynamics (1864), Boltzman’s laws in thermodynamics 
(1872/1875), Einstein’s general relativity theory (1905, 1915), and the laws of quantum me-
chanics (Schrödinger, Heisenberg and Max Born)).
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namely that our theories must in any case embrace as few things as possible. It 
also assumed that the whole is completely knowable via analysing its parts per se. 
Third is separability or disjunction, which was a critical boost to the development 
of silo-thinking (i.e. the evolvement of specific and hermetising scientific disci-
plines having no intention to obtain ideas and knowledge outside their walls). 
Albeit there was another Greek philosopher Heraclitus, whose ideology of dy-
namism and constant time-depentent change was in diametrical opposition to the 
Parmenidesian logic, his worldview had only been lurking in the shadow of sci-
entific development through the centuries waiting to be re-discovered. The lega-
cy of the Parmenidesian worldview was traceable in the conceptual frameworks 
of quantum mechanics as well as that of the theory of relativity by ignoring the 
arrow of time and the irreversibility principle described comprehensively later on 
by interdisciplinary researchers2 (i.e. there is no preferred direction of time, there 
is time-reversal symmetry in quantum mechanics, while there is the spacetime 
continuum in general relativity). Natural sciences allied together to find a unified 
theory of everything (connecting the micro-world’s laws to that of the macro-
world), but it seems to be a futile undertaking once structural and procedurial 
complex changes are also considered. For a long time, this equilibrium-centric 
view of understanding with the underlying core assumptions indicated above ne-
glected the de rigeuer aspect of non-equilibrium interspersed by interactions and 
emergence in complex systems.3 Thus, a more complexity based scientific ap-
proach started to unfold with system thinkers but only with a great inertia.4 
If Parmenides once represented statism (being), Heraclitus manifests in sys-
tem thinkers incorporating dynamism and change (becoming). Systemic think-
ing gained traction in the 20th century in a more vigorous way inter alia in the 
organismic biology, Gestalt psychology, chemical kinetics, ecology, complexity-
informed sociology and even in economics. Since natural and social sciences deal 
with living systems alike, the analysis of the relationships among the parts started 
to garner much more attention with time, especially when structural change is to 
be better understood. 
2  The oeuvre of Ilya Prigogine (1945, 1984, 1987), a Nobel-laureate in chemistry, exemplifies 
this. His research was continuously castigated by the prominent representatives of his narrow 
discipline, but his work proves that interesting findings come from starting a siege against the 
conventional walls of a particular field.
3  By now, there is an increasing body of evidence about the arrow of time, what is more, about 
the relative nature of the arrow of time (Haramein et al. 2016).
4  The term ’complexity’ gained momentum mainly in information theory, general systems theo-
ry or in the Norbert Wienerian cybernetics, however, scholars still idolized the cult of discipli-
nary narrowness. See the works of von Neumann and von Foerster, and for a comprehensive 
account on hysteresis Morin (2007). 
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Briefly and succinctly, complexity means dependent entanglement among 
the large number of parts continuously interacting with each other. In a complex 
system, macro patterns are emerging from the interactions of constituent agents 
(examples for complex systems are the universe, climate, living-organisms, eco-
systems, human cognition system, society and culture, organisations, cities, traffic, 
etc.). Let us note that a well defined and coherent complexity science is a nonexist-
ent category. Still, there are amalgams of concepts deciphered along the decades-
long course of complexity thinking in various fields dealing with such systems. 
The warp and woof concepts of complexity science, at least, can be juxtaposed 
as follows. Complex systems (1) have an interactive network of interdependent 
parts (agents), where adaptive agents and the system itself are co-evolving by in-
teracting each other in grounding self-organisation; (2) are pervaded by feedback 
mechanisms interspersed with cumulative and reflexive causation and making the 
whole to be different from that of the mere sum of the parts;5 and (3) are ruled 
by Heraclitus in the sense that there is emergence (becoming). As a consequence, 
complex systems exhibit (4) non-linear processes cultivating far-from equilibri-
um situations (turbulences)6 leading to fluctuations or instabilities (bifurcations) 
when qualitative structural changes emerge that are per se disproportionate and 
unpredictable; (5) are characterized by chaos-theory based sensitivity7, when 
even small changes can trigger big cascading or escalating effects, that is to say, 
micro fluctuations can have transformative macro effects; they therefore have 
history; (6) are non-ergodic systems in which the arrow of time and its irrevers-
ibility consequence prevail by being the creation mechanism of order out of chaos 
(when critical instability is organised), in other words, to evolve via structural 
changes.8 
5  For more than 135 years, the famous female German scientist, Amalie “Emmy” Noether de-
scribed her theorem about symmetry in nature, which is of paramount importance here if for 
no other reason than that Noether’s theorem suggests that a complex system is by no means 
equal with the sum of its parts, but the sum of its parts taken with the interactions among them.
6  Leonardo da Vinci was the first who addressed turbulence in 1508–1513 (Monaghan – Kajtar 
2014). 
7  For a recent comprehensive account on the mastermind behind chaos theory, see Henri Poin-
caré, a French mathematician, physicist, and philosopher (Verhulst 2016).
8  Using the term of complexity research, there is Self-organized Criticality (SOC) in a complex 
system like socio-economic system that may easily possess a self-organising attractor state that 
has an inherent potential for abrupt irreversible transitions of a wide range of intensities (Bak et 
al. 1988). As Prigogine (1984) claimed, the irreversibility of time is the mechanism that brings 
order out of chaos, from chaos, which is an unstable order. The concept of ergodicity was de-
veloped and cultivated at a time of mechanistic worldview, especially in statistical mechanics 
to overcome some problems. See the works of Birkhoff (1931) or von Neumann (1932), who 
came to the same conclusion.
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Without being exhaustive, the above elaborated features of complex systems 
have many important implications for a broad array of scientific fields. (1) Elimi-
nating the interactions from analysing various phenomena in systems is doomed 
to fail since it would ignore the paramount importance of the dynamic configura-
tion of processes which sustains and maintains structures.9 (2) Since non-linear 
interactions are likely to nourish fluctuations and instabilities, non-equilibrium is 
the norm rather than the exception, thus the system is exposed to radical contin-
gency, i.e. there is a great fundamental uncertainty in complex systems.10 Remov-
ing the terms of ’ceteris paribus’, ’solutions’, ’exogenous’ (shock), ’standard’ or 
phrases like ’what matters the most is’ or ’standard policies’ from our diction-
ary is in order when it comes to dealing with complex systems. (3) A low level 
of volatility in a complex system is a harbinger, or often a clear manifestation, 
of decay (crisis).11 (4) When systems change, the mathematical models and the 
equations suggesting final solutions lose their explanatory power and fail because 
outcomes are not mathematical ones, but patterns (e.g. in economics, no practi-
cal and coherent mathematical model is capable of describing the full range of 
effects of the invention of steam engine or the industrial robots because the entire 
configuration of the system changes). 
Importantly, it would be naivitae to think of complexity science having a uni-
fied and coherent, hence static structure. A singular complexity science would be 
a perverse ouroboros because the very essence of complexity science is to ad-
dress dynamism and emergence, thus its field, by very nature, must be a dynamic 
one pervaded by a panoply of various fields and concepts grasping complexity in 
an interdisciplinary fashion (e.g. computational modeling, big data, agent-based 
modeling, network analysis, socio-cybernetics, econophysics, socio-physics, 
chaos theory, systems theory, linkages and globalised world development, etc.). 
In this sense, complexity science is not to provide a unified theory, but an onto-
logical framework when it comes to dealing with complex systems, like socio-
economic innovation ecosystem.
 9  Poincaré asked whether we can eliminate interactions, and Prigogine (1990: 8) showed that it 
cannot be the instructive way forward once we want to better understand coherence and struc-
tural change in time in case of complex systems. This insight cannot be ignored in physics any 
longer, since modern physics started to emphasise that matter has lost its tangibility with more 
and more inward research and discoveries (matter into atoms, atoms into sub-atomic particles, 
sub-atomic into quantum fields and forces. Mass has no longer a primatus. Mass is the result 
of interactions among intangible quantum fields (Bagott 2017). 
10  Fundamental uncertainty originates in quantum mechanics elaborated by Werner Karl Heisen-
berg, who developed his indeterminacy principle or uncertainty principle (Umbestimmtheit, 
Umsicherheit) stating that by measuring we are creating events since we are part of the system 
and our measurement affects what we measure. 
11 A system in full equilibrium and stability is inevitably a dead system (Capra 1996). 
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3. COMPLEXITY IN OUR SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
By now, economics profession is quite able to understand where the economy 
was 10 years ago, but there is a good deal of uncertainty over what is really going 
on now. The chain of interconnected and intertwined challenges, the intensifying 
interaction of various players have been making our system ever-more complex 
by limiting our ability to predict crises as indicated in the introduction. 
Some argue that this shortcoming is given because the entire profession ne-
glected the obvious that our socio-economic ecosystem is a living complex sys-
tem of subsystems. People, organisations, institutions embedded in the environ-
ment are the main constituents of our socio-economic ecosystem by perpetually 
interacting with each other and creating emerging patterns mainly through non-
linear network phenomenon (network phenomena are, for example smoking, 
crying, wealth, poverty, bank lending, non-complying loans, crashes, European 
integration, etc.).12
Section 3 aims at (1) deciphering whether we neglected what we already knew 
by taking an illustrative historical overview of the development of complexity-
aware economic thinking along the last two centuries (i.e. the ideas of the most 
influential economics thinkers are matched with the messages of complexity sci-
ence described in the previous section); and (2) demonstrating why there is still a 
need for relatively new lenses of complexity to address what is really going on in 
the socio-economic ecosystem showing ever-more complexity.13
3.1. The duel between Parmenidesian and Heraclitusian economics 
The following short historical account on scientists and economists validates, to 
a great extent, our claim that there has always been some sort of predilection in 
economics to overcome simplicity (i.e. to see the complex system with its nu-
ances in the spirit of Heraclitus). Unfortunately, economics had inclined to think 
of nouns (i.e. long-lasting structures) instead of verbs (changing processes and in-
teractions in the system) for a long time in a Parmenidesian sense. The economy 
was not primarily considered as a complex, but just a complicated system that can 
be totally understood and governed by relying on simplified and stylised models, 
12  It is hardly by chance that Heisenberg stated (1958: 65) that “The world thus appears as a 
complicated tissue of events, in which connections of different kinds alternate or overlap or 
combine and thereby determine the texture of the whole.” 
13  Since complexity science is the amalgam of different approaches having the same gradient to-
wards dynamic systems with constantly evolving properties and patterns, not all such theories 
and concepts are adaptable to social inquiry. See more on this by Byrne – Callagham (2013).
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based on methods of natural sciences (e.g. physics), applied to a closed economy 
or its particular sector. Still, one can find dissonant voices in the works of promi-
nent scholars and economists.14
Thinking about basic questions of Adam Smith (where does wealth come 
from, how wealth is distributed), Léon Walras turned to an economic approach 
dominated by mathematical language simply because of his firm belief in perfect 
free competition requiring abstract presumptions (e.g. no trade out of equilib-
rium) and disregarding reality of the production process.15 Compared to Walras, 
Alfred Marshall recognised the fundamental flawness Walras (and others) made: 
“It may be well to insist again that we do not assume that competition is per-
fect. Perfect competition requires a perfect knowledge of the state of the market 
[…]” (Marshall 1920: 540–541). Despite the still abstract assumptions, Marshall 
tried to capture the trading process in real time by not denying the relevance 
of far-from equilibrium. Nevertheless, his contribution still had a bias towards 
considering partial equilibrium, merely. As Joseph A. Schumpeter came to the 
scene as a non-technical, verbal economist, the then-fashionable mathematical 
economics was challenged for a moment. As opposed to Walras and Marshall, 
Schumpeter addressed the side of production as well by building on a more ho-
listic approach making entrepreneurship and its innovation activity, that spark 
productivity and wealth, to be the focal point of analysis. In this way, dynamic 
order, the process of becoming via changes was incorporated (creative destruc-
tion). Nonetheless, economists of that time were still about to approach eco-
nomic issues in a mathematically coherent way (building on the assumptions of 
rationality, general equilibrium).16 Schumpeter’s innovation was therefore con-
sidered by mainsteam economists only as an exogenous variable (and his works 
were not taught at Berkeley).
14  As Ha-Joon Chang emphasised at a conference in Budapest, Hungary in March 2018: only 
a third of the 9 major schools of economics look at the world as complex and uncertain sys-
tem. See, for example Chang (2014). Our paper, without being exhaustive, mainly refers to 
those influential representatives of various schools whose understanding can be more or less 
matched with the messages of complexity science. 
15  Walras believed in some sort of universal force arranging the system towards equilibrium all 
the time (Walras 1900, 1954). What is more, as Reaume (1996:147) demonstrates in a book 
edited by David Colander who was one of the first advocates of the changing face of main-
stream economics, in a Walrasian approach, the whole is just the sum of its parts. As a corol-
lary, the influential role of interactions is not taken into account (e.g. for Walras, entry onto the 
production side is unlimited, however, this is not really the case). 
16  In his review on the theory of perfect competition, Stigler unravelled the unrealistic feature of 
the concept, but also showed the dominant use of it by mentioning: “[…] it has proved to be 
a tough and resilient concept, and it will stay with us in recognizable form for a long time to 
come.” (Stigler 1957: 17).
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One of the reasons behind preferring the general equilibrium principle further 
on was that, as in natural sciences as well as the Parmenidesian-logic dictates, 
mainstream economists were to decipher time-dependent universal laws and reg-
ularities in the economic system. This kind of entrenched belief or goal was chal-
lenged by some system thinkers but with a very limited echo effect in the circle 
of mainstream economics. For example, the father of Ordoliberalism, Eucken 
(1949) stressed that theories pursuing universal statements are nothing but lame-
duck attempts.17 Another equally important figure of the German Ordoliberalism 
was Röpke (1950), who also underlined the crucial importance of fundamental 
uncertainty into the system by stating: “No idea, no opportunity that could be 
excluded. No distinct boundaries, no unalterable points, no rigid fundaments that 
could stabilise [...]. Any kind of behaviour of individuals and governments is 
conceivable; we shall be prepared even for the most absurd and abnormal thing.” 
(Röpke 1950: 58–59)
Albeit the giants of economics, Hayek and Keynes sometimes seemed to ad-
vocate thoughts being within the paradigm of general equilibrium (i.e. pursuing 
a stable full employment equilibrium). They both believed in the endogenous 
nature of business cycle and offered a fertile ground for a more complexity based 
economic thinking. Some of their alarming considerations fell on deaf ears, espe-
cially when they emphasised complexity-related features that are heavily affect-
ing macro outcomes and, as Hayek said, patterns18 (e.g. the non-negligible char-
acter of time horizon for decisions; the cognitive shortcomings of heterogeneous 
and interacting agents, hence their limited knowledge and foresight; the role of 
emergence (becoming as ’spontaneous order’)19 and the fact that the whole is 
much more than the sheer sum of its parts). Unsurprisingly, due to the inexhaust-
ible complexity of the ecosystem, the Hayekian view favours rule-following and 
cautious governance over extensive discretionalism (i.e. avoiding the pretence 
of perfect and complete knowledge is of essence in the case of complexity and 
17  These theories would totally neglect the nuances of the world and the psyche of people (all 
things people do can have unintended negative consequences departing the system from equi-
librium by invalidating universal theories). The world must be, as John Stuart Mill emphasised 
(Mill 1859|2001: 89), a mix of different opinions, perceptions where individuality should be 
deliberated and pursued to reach out wellbeing. This organically brings fluctuations into the 
system.
18  Seeking ’laws’ in complex systems, which economics has to deal with, is a futile undertaking 
and the whole aspiration is probably the result of inductivism. See this argument in Hayek 
(1967).
19  See: Hayek (1945). Let us note that the concept was also recognised and promoted, but sadly 
overlooked by the wider public, by another verbal economist, Michael Polanyi at that time. 
See Polanyi (1939) or for a more general account on the ignorance of Polanyi see Jacobs 
(1998). 
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high uncertainty) (Hayek 1960, 1974). Even those remarks of Keynes did have an 
instant and immediate effect on the overly sanguine view about using compara-
tive statism in which he questioned the approach by calling for the incorpora-
tion of complex and incommensurable magnitudes (Keynes 1930, 1971) (i.e. to 
take into account dynamism and fluctuations (emergence) generated mainly by 
heterogeneous expectations of various agents, the intrinsic difficulty of quanti-
fication in a complex and open system leading to limited knowledge, organic 
interdependence in the network of agents that tend to show ’animal spirits’ by 
creating instabilities20).21 Still, at that time, the equilibrium and stability centric 
views of the mainstream remained resistant to such considerations. Nonetheless, 
years later, as Ferrari-Filho and Conceição (2005) or Rosser (2006) pointed out, 
post-keynesian economists and institutionalists started to enshrine the idea of dis-
equilibrium and the central importance of fundamental uncertainty.
In addition, the classical postulate of rational expectations was not without 
discordants even at the birth of the concept, either. True, the term was coined by 
Muth (1961) in his seminal paper and the concept was put into the centre of the 
neoclassical synthesis and that of mainstraim economic models, Muth himself 
and the Nobel-laureate system thinker, Herbert A. Simon, explicitly expressed 
their concerns that there is a huge discrepancy between theoretical rational ex-
pectations and the way the economy actually works.22 Despite the growing body 
of evidence about the shortcoming of the concept, it lived its mainstream life later 
on (mainly by assuming that there must be rational expectations at the aggregate 
level of the society, however, there has been no model so far that could properly 
address the learning process whereby the assumed convergence to rational expec-
tations equilibrium can emerge).23
It lasted for decades then until the profession started to consider agents (indi-
viduals, households, firms, even institutions) as rational players but having mere-
ly limited and local knowledge.24 For example, although Kenneth Arrow is touted 
as one of the most influential founders and developers of mathematical econom-
ics interspersed with equilibrium orientation, it is often neglected that his work at 
the same time was pervaded by a soupçon of alarming by noting the limitations 
20  The incredulity at the approach of Keynes might be of importance, however, criticism must 
be refined if all the notes are considered in Chapter 18 of The General Theory, when Keynes 
admits that variables are constantly changing, “hence the extreme complexity of the actual 
course of events” (Chapter 18: 249). 
21 Keynes (1936|1973, 1921|1973, 1930|1971).
22 Simon (1962, 1978).
23  It depends on whether positive or negative expectations feedbacks are considered (Assenza et 
al. 2014: 61). 
24 See more on this agent-based literature Epstein (2007) and LeBaron (2006).
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of rational expectations and by claiming satirically that people must be superior 
statisticians to the future general equilibrium (Arrow 1978:157–169).25 An unde-
servingly underrated contribution in this regard was Krupp (1966), whose essays 
acknowledged complexity (and unknowables) in a more vigorous way, such as 
Kenneth E. Boulding (1966), whose socio-economic understanding was holistic 
by giving special attention to the open, dynamic character of the economy as well 
as to the essence of memory (psychic capital) either in the real economy or in the 
financial sector.26 Psychic capital, as a dynamic concept, is exposed to and can be 
a driver of fluctuations or feedbacks known from system theorists. What is even 
more important is that, despite all readible efforts of Adam Smith in offering a 
more or less dynamic view implying a great potential of feedback system (Mayr 
1971), and despite the reappearance of the term ‘feedback’ in the 1940s partly 
sparked by the development of other scientific disciplines27, incorporating the 
concept in the field of economics had remained rather limited until recently.28 
Nonetheless, in the beginning of 1970s, mainstream economists were still a 
staunch supporter of building ever-more complicated econometric macro-mod-
els, economists like Robert Lucas, Finn E. Kydland, Edward C. Prescott, Thomas 
J. Sargent and Robert M. Townsend made general equilibrium central to macr-
oeconomic thinking. However, the real performance of these models remained 
abysmally low, especially with the advent of oil crises. There were some econo-
mists proposing that the prevailing macroeconomic thinking be broadened (e.g. 
taking into account not only nominal rigidities and the interest rate instrument, 
including also other distortions, etc.), their flair, in turn, was rather moderated 
25  In addition, Arrow tried to be the ‘arrow of time’ by stimulating younger scholars to start 
thinking and modelling about asymmetric information in the perfect competiton framework. 
See the works of Robert J. Aumann in fields of game theory, whose interest was strongly pro-
pelled towards such imperfection. 
26  Psychic capital, coined by Boulding (1950:140), embraces memories of pleasure, success, 
achievement, recognition as well as memories of failures, disasters, atrocities, or perceived 
injustices and indignities. It, thus, influences expectations, decisions of agents and, of course, 
the public support of economic policy actions. This is why precise prediction in social system 
is rather limited, and mostly impossible.
27  Norbert Wiener and his co-authors inspired many scientists to address feedbacks (See: Rosen-
blueth et al. 1943). For example, Gregory Bateson or Margaret Mead in anthropology, Warren 
S. McCulloch in neurophysiology and cybernetics, Wolfgang Köhler in psychology, and John 
von Neumann in mathematical economics.
28  See the reflexivity principle introduced by Soros (2003), which is about mutual and non-linear 
dependency via forward and backward linkages. System thinkers, like Capri – Luisi (2014) 
expressed the concept by saying that we cannot understand the dynamics of the human heart in 
terms of the interactions of its cells because the behaviour of every cell depends on the overall 
state of the heart itself. Causality works in both directions.
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at the level of the basic neoclassical model.29 The forward looking and rational 
homo economicus (representative agents) living in a Parmenidesian equilibrium 
world continued to be the favoured modelling framework. 
As the renowned psychologist, Daniel Kahneman (2011) showed, people sim-
ply cannot live in a state of perpetual uncertainty, therefore there is a bias to make 
up the best story possible and we live as if the story were true. This was partly 
behind the belief that economic governance and economics could develop the 
theories and tools with which the economy is manageable, and the era of Great 
Moderation (approximately between 1992–2007) was a result of such progress. 
In fact, with a complexity-aware mindset, the era of low volatility can be consid-
ered as a signal of encoding instability.30 With the eruption of the 2008 financial 
and economic global crisis and its ensuing Great Recession, models like the most 
beloved dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE)31 ignoring cru-
cial aspects (e.g. heterogeneity, becoming, financial system, psychological find-
ings, etc.)32 were admittedly proved to be “seriously flawed” (Blanchard 2016) 
undertakings in explaining what is really going on in the ever-more complex 
economy.33 This confession per se indicates that complexity should be better in-
tegrated in the future, or, at least, the diversity of macro models is needed because 
we have different tasks to be done.34
Some sort of awakening in macroeconomics has been started among main-
stream economists: acknowledging imperfect knowledge about the complex socio-
29  See Shackle’s works (1967, 1976) for incorporating time, becoming and some sort of memory 
into the models. See the well-known Hungarian system thinker’s work, Kornai (1971|1990) 
calling for disequilibrium-research, or the paper by Diamond – Dybvig (1983) focusing on 
disequilibrium by studying bank panics and financial crisis, Bernanke – Gertler (1989) devot-
ing special attention to financial fluctuations, Holmström – Tirole (1998) incorporating ag-
gregate uncertainty on liquidity analysis or Erceg et al. (2000) presenting a model with a more 
monopolistic competition. On why the mainstream remained so resistant, see: Csaba (2017).
30  Low level of volatility in case of complex systems (interactive systems) can be a trouble sign 
too (Arthur 2015).
31  Christiano et al. (2017) wrote a contemporary apologia in favouring DSGE models, however, 
the authors fall short in explaining the sustainability and powerfulness of such models if real-
ity is to be grasped. See: http://bruegel.org/2017/12/the-dsge-model-quarrel-again/ (Accessed 
on: 26.03.2018)
32  See the shortcomings of the micro based macro modelling, Gertler – Kiyotaki (2015), or Gatti 
et al. (2010).
33  See the critique of mainstream economists: Blanchard et al. (2010). Even the simpler models 
were more able to explain what is happening and to make some predictions, see the compre-
hensive paper of Gürkaynak et al. (2013). 
34  See: Blanchard – Summers (2017) or https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/
need-different-classes-macroeconomic-models (Accessed on: 26.03.2018)
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 economic system35; incorporating more and more features of complex systems 
into our models (e.g. emergence in the form of qualitative structural change via 
techno-economic paradigmatic shifts36, behavioral dynamic heterogeneous agent 
models that consider boundedly rational agents and non-linearity as well37); and 
encapsulating the financial world and the psyche which is of key importance.38
Our rudimentary overview has so far illustrated that complexity-consciousness 
has been by no means a rare asset in economics, rather a mostly ignored one. 
Consequently, today’s economics should not neglect what we once knew. Yet, our 
paper argues that there is still a substantiated need for new lenses of complexity 
to address what is really going on in the ever-more complex ecosystem.
3.2. Beyond tilting at windmills – towards a Heraclitusian Economics
As Heraclitus argued, opposition brings concord. However, whether the former 
and present-day system-minded economists can jointly overcome tilting at wind-
mills by triggering a paradigm shift in the fiendishly resistant mainstream eco-
nomics is still an open question. Based partly upon our previous historical over-
view we argue that shifting towards complexity economics is inevitable because 
35  For example, see the stream of imperfect knowledge economics marshalled by Roman Fryd-
nam and Michael D. Goldberg (2007, 2011) which reinterprets the Knightian uncertainty. 
Another mainstream economist, Paul De Grauwe proposes complexity-aware macro model-
ling by acknowledging the dynamic patterns evolving along the state-market co-evolution 
cycle (De Grauwe 2017). By the same token, the distinguished Polish economist, Grzegorz 
W. Kołodko (2011, 2014a, 2014b) also calls for analysing changes rather than states via new 
pragmatism. 
36  The theory of techno-economic paradigm means that since the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution in England in the 18th century, socio-economic development has a cyclically 
evolving pattern driven by technological revolutions (Big Booms) (followed by installation 
and deployment phases) by forming qualitatively anew techno-economic paradigm (Perez 
2009; Kovács 2015). The latest ICT-based service-oriented techno-economic paradigm started 
to evolve in the 1970s, and it is now the context sparking the so-called fourth industrial revolu-
tion and the digital economy.
37  Strategies changing evolutionarily by leading to steady states and leaving them towards dy-
namic, complex chaotic dynamics via reflexivity, that is to say, how micro fluctuations are 
amplified onto the macro level by triggering changes in macro patterns (Hommes 2013, 2016). 
In agent based behavioural models, agents try to cope with complexity by adaptive learning 
(i.e. refining simple heuristics) when it comes to forecasting.
38  This was acknowledged even by one of the most cited economists, Andrei Shleifer, a neoclas-
sical mainstream economist, who studied the psychology of the financial crises (Gennaioli et 
al. 2015) being undeniably influenced by the work of Daniel Kahneman (Shleifer 2012). About 
capturing the increasing complexity in the financial system, see Battiston et al. (2016a).
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of the ever-more intensifying complexity pervaded by interwoven wicked chal-
lenges. 
Globalisation, and digitalisation as its carrier mechanism, has led to ever-more 
increasing number of nodes and inter-linkages, while the nature of inter-linkages 
has also been changed, not to mention the fact that the speed at which a stimulus 
or shock propagates to other nodes has been much faster in today’s socio-eco-
nomic complex system. 
One of the thorniest challenges of the world economy today is the widely 
perceptible backlash against globalisation. Many people feel that they have been 
left behind and the globalisation machine does not seem to be working for all (i.e. 
more and more stranded communities, maldistribution of benefits of the globali-
sation). The consequence of this is the weakening trust and confidence in national 
and supranational governance, ultimately, in current economics. 
The backlash against globalisation, meaning increasing criticality for govern-
ance, that is to say, the ailing trust in current economics is due to the complex 
interplay among intertwined challenges: 
(i)  secular stagnation (lowering productivity growth implying weakening 
innovation performance since the 1970s);39 
(ii)  demographic challenge (e.g. ageing population with shrinking active la-
bour force in developed countries, while increasing labour force in devel-
oping countries; increasing income and wealth inequalities and impover-
ishment in the developed countries);40 
(iii)  climate change (air pollution, intensifying weather anomalies, increasing 
temperature, etc.); 
(iv)  broken harmony between financial sector and the real economy (i.e. de-
liberating globalising financial sphere was with the objective of achiev-
ing ‘infinite’ capital mobility in space and time, financial system then 
figured out that there is no need for the real economy to realise profits, 
39  Average growth rate of the U.S. and that of the EU was 4% in 1950–1960s, it then slowed 
down, and the potential growth has become approximately 2% by the 2010s, merely. Wages 
have been mainly stagnating as well discouraging more risky innovations (Nolan et al. 2016). 
Despite shortcomings in measurement, productivity slow down is out there (Byrne et al. 2016). 
Moreover, Bloom et al. (2017) pointed out that today’s productivity growth is reached out by 
20 times more researchers than before the 1970s. See more on secular stagnation: Gordon 
(2012), Teulings – Baldwin (2014).
40  As OECD (2017a) conveys, in OECD countries, the average income of the top 10 per cent has 
increased to almost 10 times that of the bottom 10 per cent, up from seven times in the mid-
1980s. The richest one per cent own 19 per cent of global wealth, while three per cent is shared 
between the poorest 40 per cent. Plus, the decreasing trend in relative poverty in high-income 
countries has become rather anaemic and even stalled since the Great Recession (Ravallion – 
Chen 2017: 32).
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it has become a self-propelling mechanism and the financial sector does 
not seem to be an efficient intermediator any longer but it has been show-
ing a parasite-like behaviour by becoming a financial casino);41 
(v)  changing characteristics of emerging markets (i.e. becoming more serv-
ice and consumption driven economy, which is slowing down and having 
global impetus on the world economy, e.g. China);42 
(vi)  the sui generis sovereign debt crisis of 2008 and its aftermath resulting 
in limited fiscal capacities to stimulate the economies (i.e. low real and 
nominal interest rates, combined with low growth, high debt, and popu-
list pressure, encoding the potential of fiscal crises); 
(vii)  the fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0 together with the Digital 
Economy fueled by nine technologies (Kovács 2017a)) also triggers un-
certainties over its unintended socio-economic and environmental con-
sequences (e.g. whether it is a turning point (bifurcation point) to the 
becoming of another techno-economic paradigm; what can we say about 
Industry 4.0 and inequality nexus, Industry 4.0 and productivity nexus, 
Industry 4.0 and inclusive growth nexus, etc.).
At this point, at least two system-related observations arise. First, by apply-
ing a term borrowed from complexity science, these wicked problems seem to be 
the manifestation of self-organised criticality in the socio-economic innovation 
ecosystem of today.43 These wicked challenges are spanning across the countries’ 
borders, tackling them requires a more systematic understanding of their nature at 
national, regional and continent-wide levels to have a chance for meaningful re-
41  There are extensive intra-financial exposures in derivatives markets (European Systemic Risk 
Board 2016). As a consequence, the beneficial and lively connection between finance and the 
real economy suffers. Additionally, the non-banking financial companies started to soar in the 
shadow by leading to bubbles and overvaluation of assets (the shadow-banking exposure of 
the EU-banks are significant, see Abad et al. (2017: 35)). The parasitic character of the finan-
cial sphere is also mirrored in the course of the growing trends in share buy-backs, thereby 
the players are to boost the stock market. It implies that they are not looking for riskier, but 
productivity-enhancing investments in the real economy (40% of S&P 500 firms bought back 
shares in 1990, their proportion was 60% in 1997–2003, while 85% of today). It also generates 
a bias towards larger companies at the expense of the middle ones (Andrews et al. 2016). 
42  For the impact of the Chinese economic slowdown (due to its transformation into a more 
internal oriented, consumption based service economy) on European export dynamics (World 
Bank 2016).
43  For a system that is in a self-organised critical state, in other words, in a far-from-equilibrium 
situation with critical instabilities (Prigogine 1997), the magnitude of the next transition is 
unpredictable, but the long-term probability distribution of event magnitudes is a well-known 
distribution called “power law” (Aschwanden 2013).
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finement of dominating economic policy toolkit (e.g. systemic risk in the financial 
system, too-central-to-fail and too-big-to-fail cases, Battiston et al. 2016b).44 Har-
monising economic, social and environmental dimensions by affecting complex 
and non-linear processes within (e.g. euphores for the new technologies and serv-
ices of the anew technological revolution like Industry 4.045), what is more, fend-
ing off the escalation of anthropogenic climate change require collective action. 
Importantly, collective action rests upon the capacity of nation states and on com-
mon comprehension of ongoing processes that are sought to direct common goals.
Second, our socio-economic innovation ecosystem is a complex system, what 
is more, is a dissipative system.46 Such systems, described by Ilya Prigogine, are 
open, adaptive, showing irreversibilities in time, and can change course by creat-
ing qualitatively new structures. The existence of such system relies heavily and 
primarily on the flow of energy (i.e. exchanges with the outside world, in our 
case, the energy is knowledge crystallised in innovation and smart adaptation). 
An example for such a system is a vortex in the water, whose pattern is dynamic 
and its shape is sustainable up until the flow of water is guaranteed. Metaphori-
cally, a Heraclitusian economics shall recognise that our socio-economic system 
is sustainable up until the co-evolution of state and market is synergetic enough to 
eventuate in capacity building for continuous innovation and smart adaptation.47
4. CONCLUSIONS FOR MODERN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
Our paper portends a dismal prognosis about the policy horizon of economic 
governance, which is getting ever-more limited as complexity grows. Due to the 
ever-increasing complexity and the wicked challenges described, no one is fully 
44  In so doing, avoiding the tendency toward increasing complexity of regulation is of high im-
portance. See: Krueger – Duncan (1993) who recognised the feedback loops leading to more 
and more complex regulation. 
45  Kovács (2017) demonstrates that fostering Industry 4.0 in China is encoding inefficiency via 
rent-seeking. 
46  A living system is never in full equilibrium, except when it is dead. Thus, a living system, 
such as the society, is a dissipative system being in far-from equilibrium, and such system per 
se can also be seen as a self-organised critical system (Kron – Grund 2009; Scheffer 2009), 
which means that the structure of that system remains for a long time despite the constant flow 
and change of its components, then a critical state emerges by creating a qualitatively new 
structure.
47  Beinhocker (2006) envisaged that a gargantuan paradigmatic change is occuring in econom-
ics. True, the degree of interdisciplinarity has been increasing (Angrist et al. 2017ab), a com-
plexity-based policy approach has been outlining (OECD 2017), and some courses in econom-
ics are more and more streamlined (Bowles 2017), CORE programme, http://econ-core.org.
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in charge, no one can fully scientifically properly overlook ex ante the whole 
system and all the effects of actions imposed because of complexity. There is, 
therefore, no fool-proof silver bullet to wicked problems. Moreover, the open, 
dynamic socio-economic innovation ecosystem does not have by very nature a 
code filled with elementary and universal laws. It seems that we have reached the 
end of big theories.48 
Once economics profession and practitioners are to consider the economy as a 
complex system, newfangled economic governance with refined policy mix shall 
emerge49 in a more humble way by building on what we once knew and what we 
still have to learn about complexity. 
We argue that the changing course toward a more Heraclitusian Economics 
– which is more interdisciplinary and appreciates the features of complex dy-
namic systems, such as interactions, dynamic configuration of processes, non-
 equilibrium, fundamental uncertainty (unknown unknowns, unexpectedness), 
emergence and patterns, etc. – is inevitable and it shall be accompanied with 
pursuing contingency governance. Our paper does by no means aim at drawing 
comprehensive policy roadmap, but to lay down the basic principles of such gov-
ernance which are as follows.
Enhancing the stability of trust dynamics: Without trust, any kind of economic 
governance can fall short because of the political instability. To this end, the fol-
lowing sub-principles are to be pursued by a contingency governance: modesty, 
decentralisation, collaborative and horizontal mindset, and experimentalism. 
Since uncertainty is the new norm that calls for modesty in goals and our ability/
capacity via economic policy. Fatal conceit can be reduced and modesty can be 
bolstered through decentralisation. The higher the degree of decentralised gov-
ernance, the more fertile ground is given for being closer to the society in a more 
transparent way leading to more intensive collaboration. Collaborative and hori-
zontal (interdisciplinary, interdepartmental) mindset therefore should be cultivat-
ed (i.e. accepting that single-purpose governance entities and departments with 
silo-thinking are no longer capable of being in a great help, and collaboration is 
a mechanism to make things sustainable). In this way, building on the literature 
of higher decentralisation/federalism, a more efficient and faster social learning 
can be initiated via the series of parallel innovations and smart adaptations that 
reinforces and enhances the trust infrastructure. 
48  Endism was also raised in other stream of economics literature decades ago, namely in devel-
opment economics (Bookstaber 2017; Musto 1986).
49  Colander – Kupers (2016) led to similar conclusion, but they are still presupposing some con-
vergence towards equilibrium.
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Considerately promoting dynamism in the innovation ecosystem: Complex-
ity science nourishes the message that, beyond stability, society needs amplifi-
cation, fluctuation and emergence leading to qualitative structural change. The 
candidate sub-principles in this regard are as follows: festina lente, systems view, 
differential diagnosis, and equability. With the appearance of the fourth indus-
trial revolution (i.e. cyberphysical systems in smart factories and its ancillary 
technologies), the principle of make haste slowly (festina lente) together with the 
principle of system thinking are in order because of the unclear unintended con-
sequences and trade-offs that this development gives rise in the system (concerns 
over the feasibility of proper cybersecurity; impacts on consumption patterns; 
concerns over the use of Big Data and nowcasting methods in informing about 
what is really happening; impact of digitalisation as well as automation on em-
ployment, people’s mental state, etc.). System thinking means focusing on inter-
actions (e.g. disharmony between the financial sphere and the real economy with 
its non-linear repercussions) and the intention to creating patterns rather than 
pursuing numerical static targets. In this way, together with a good deal of criti-
cal thinking, more productive governmental investments can be achieved. This 
has to be made in a differential manner (i.e. there are huge differences across 
countries in terms of formal and informal institutions as well as regulations). 
Promoting the bottom-up character of dynamism can manifest in cultivating eq-
uability (dampening extreme income and wealth inequality but also outbalanc-
ing and unfolding individual opportunities) whereby not only inclusiveness, but 
talents, and therefore, innovativeness can also be promoted by giving new e’lan 
into the system’s dynamics.
Breeding resilience in the socio-economic innovation ecosystem: the outlined 
characteristics of complex systems calls for a modern economic governance 
equipped with the capacities of absorbing shocks, bouncing back (i.e. better in-
formed fiscal and monetary policies50 with buffers should be in tandem in provid-
ing necessary latitude to navigate through uncertainty; rebuilding more progres-
sive tax systems with the rethinking as well as the retailoring that of the automatic 
stabilisers by involving the aspect of supporting research and development and 
innovation), and last but not at all least, transmogrifying its dynamic configura-
tion via putting lessons learnt into practice (i.e. admitting the fact that structural 
reforms are not the mechanisms directing towards equilibrium, but the perpetual 
50  By building on new tools and methods such as complexity narrative techniques, network anal-
ysis, evolutionary logic, qualitative scenario thinking, non-linear dynamics, historical analysis 
and (reverse) stress testing. 
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moving mechanisms to make the configuration of processes as much synergetic 
as possible).51 
Ultimately, economics must broaden its research canvas by acknowledging 
what Newton emphasised centuries ago: every scientific field shall find a starting 
point which is per se unexplained, however, that point is the basis of all explana-
tion. In our case, this is complexity, which forces economics and policymakers to 
be more humble by not condemning ambivalence. Without pursuing a complexity 
based economic approach52, without acknowledging individual and system-wide 
interactions (at least most of them), macroeconomics may indeed be doomed and 
policies tend to fall short in becoming the insturments of a sustainable develop-
ment value-congruent governance and what any kind of governance will have is 
just a cacophony of ideas that are nothing more than a theater of empty rhetoric. 
To this end, all of us should consider complexity economics as a research pro-
gram rather than a singular theory.
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